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Mermin correctly points out that Bohr did not use the term “action-at-
a-distance” in connection with the influence that was under discussion in his
exchange with EPR. Nor did the latter authors. But Einstein later spoke of
“spooky action-at-a-distance” and identified it as the key point when he said8
“One can escape from this [EPR] conclusion only by either assuming that the
measurement of S1 ((telepathically)) changes the real situation of S2 or by deny-
ing independent real situations as such to things that are spatially separated
from each other.” Bohr himself translated the mathematical EPR argument
into a physical procedure that involved “a rigid diaphragm with two paral-
lel slits, which are very narrow compared with their separation, and through
each of which one particle with given momentum passes independently of the
other.” An experimenter subsequently can measure either the momentum or
the position of one of the two particle, and the point of Bohr’s argument was to
show that this measurement of one particle does, within his knowledge-based,
prediction-oriented framework, influence the other particle, thereby upsetting
the condition “without in any way disturbing the system”, which EPR require
in order to apply their criterion of physical reality.
Mermin’s claim to have found an error in my argument hinges on his claim
that I set down conditions under which counterfactuals can be used. But I set
down no such conditions. I argued against the wholesale exclusion of counterfac-
tual argumentation by giving some simple examples. Mermin misread me if he
thought I was requiring all counterfactuals to be of that simplest kind. Rather I
adhered throughout to the rules [modal logic] that philosophers have developed
for specifying the meanings of counterfactual conditions.
Thus Mermin should not claim that there was an error in my reasoning:
that I violated precepts that I myself had set forth. Rather, if he wants to limit
the meaningfulness of counterfactual statements then he should show why the
normal rules of counterfactual reasoning [as developed by philosophers who deal
with this problem] must be augmented in a way that makes my proof invalid.
Mermin’s central claim is that my statement
(S): If R2 was performed and gave +, then performing R1, instead, would
have given –.
is neither true nor false, if L1 is performed, but meaningless. Mermin’s
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argument for this is that: “I am merely noting that the statement fails to meet
the rule for when a counterfactual makes sense.” Later he says “The essential
ambiguity responsible for the gap in Stapp’s argument lies not in LOC2 but in
the statement (S) to which Stapp wishes to apply LOC2. The counterfactual
part of (S), which apparently refers only to past events (which is essential for
the applicability of LOC2) actually makes implicit reference to future events,
through the criterion for the validity of a counterfactual statement. This implicit
future reference does not make LOC2 fail: it renders LOC2 inapplicable.
Mermin refers “the rule” or “the criterion” for the meaningfulness or va-
lidity of a counterfactual statement. The rule he proposes was taken from my
discussion of a simple example. I will accept this criterion as a conservative suf-
ficient condition for meaningfulness. This is useful because it leads, as Mermin
points out, to the meaningfulness of (S) under condition L2. This is important
because quantum physicists are prone to the easy view that only the actually
performed experiment has any significance, and hence all counterfactual argu-
mentation is meaningless. That view would make the entire Bohr-EPR exchange
meaningless, because the entire discussion is about the effect of changing a free
choice made in one place upon physical reality elsewhere, and this notion is for-
mulated in terms of counterfactuals. Bohr did not challenge EPR on the basis of
the meaninglessness of counterfactuals in science. Rather he affirmed that one
could regard the choices made by the experimenters as “free”, and could talk
in the normal way about such things at the level of experimental procedures and
observable possible results. He took the tack of redefining the meaning of “phys-
ical reality”. Thus Mermin’s challenge to my argument is basically dissimiliar
to Bohr’s challenge to EPR.
The importance of the conservative Stapp-Mermin criterion is that it pro-
vide a toe-hold. By validating (S) under condition L2 it establishes that there is
something to talk about. For it establishes that Nature has some deep structure
that goes beyond what actually happens: it says that, under the condition that
L2 is performed later, there is in Nature some connection of what actually hap-
pens in the earlier region to what would have happened there if the experimenter
there had made the opposite choice. This derived property would have happened
is not based on any assumption of determinism: it comes out of the predictions
of quantum theory itself, in conjunction with the locality condition LOC1.
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Having established under the conservative criterion that Nature has a deep
structure that extends beyond the bounds of the single actually occurring situ-
ation, and relates actual happenings to what would have happened if... we have
made the big leap. In exploring further this deep structure we must make sure
that our words are not just verbal formulas: they are supposed to be describing
various other aspects of this deep structure of nature. Without that connec-
tion of our words to the now-establihed deep structure the whole project would
collapse.
Philosophers have worked out rules [modal logic] for dealing with this sit-
uation: these rules allow our use of words to conform correctly to the natural
meaning normally ascribed to those words. I adhere to those rules, which are
completely appropriate to the situation under consideration here, where our
purpose is to explore properties of nature that involve connections among alter-
native possibilities that we are free to create.
Statement (S) has a natural meaning that is captured in modal logic. This
condition is formulated within a theoretical context of pairs of possible worlds
that are almost the same, but that differ in some specified way at some first time
where there is a significant difference. The theoretical contemplation of such
slightly differing pairs is even more reasonable in a nondeterministic quantum
context than in a deterministic classical context, since within the former context
one should be able to contemplate two possible worlds that are the same at
some time except that in one the decay of a radioactive nucleus has just been
detected, and this detection will cause the second experiment to be performed,
whereas in the other possible world this decay has not been detected, and the
first experiment will consequently be performed.
The meaning of (S) closely parallels the meaning of an ordinary statement
“If under condition A result x appears, then under condition B result y ap-
pears”. The essential difference is that the extra word “instead” in (S) breaks
the usual rule that truth of the first condition (R2) allows one to conclude that
the contradictory premise (R1) of the subordinate clause is false. This change
allows one to relate the possibilities for the outcome of the two alterative possible
experiments in the way specified by the sentence.
This “meaning” of statement (S) is strictly in terms of a relationship be-
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tween the possibilities for the outcomes of alternative possible experiments both
of which are confined to the region R. This asserted connection between the
possibilities for the outcomes of the two alternative possible experiments may,
by virtue of the deep structure of nature, be true or false under various possible
conditions, but they do not automatically become “meaningless” if not directly
provable in some simplest way.
Given this natural meaning, the statement (S) could conceivably remain
true if L1 is performed instead of L2. LOC2 is just the assertion that (S) does
remain true under this substitution. This property is plausible because the free
choice between L1 and L2 does not occur until after everything referred to in
(S) has already either happened or not happened: so it is hard to see how the
truth of (S) could depend on the later free choice without there being some
backward-in-time influence.
Mermin claims that the criterion for meaningfulness, regarded now as a
necessary condition, shows that LOC2 cannot be applied because the “meaning”
of (S) “implicitly” involves events in L. In my earlier reply I countered his
argument by ascribing the natural meaning to (S) [i.e., the meaning in terms of
constraints on possibilities of outcomes] simply as a matter of definition, which I
am entitled to do, and in fact am obliged to do because this is the strict meaning
by virtue of which (S) is proved to be true under condition L2. Then I defined
LOC2 as simply asserting that (S) held true also under condition L1. Then
is there no question about the “applicability” of this condition of LOC2: it is
nothing more than the /it assertion that the deep structure of nature is such
as to make that connection between possibilities of outcomes that is directly
described by (S) continue to hold if the later free choice is to perform L1 instead
of L2.
Once it has been established that the deep structure in nature exists, then
one should adhere consistently to the natural meaning of (S) as a description
of a possible consequence of that structure, rather than sometimes branding (S)
as meaningless when, as a description of a possible consequence of this deep
structure that is under investigation, it has a natural meaning.
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